Introduction
Since the early 1980s, most countries in sub-Saharan Africa (hereafter called Africa for convenience) have experienced structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), sometimes followed by economic recovery programmes (ERPs), where the emphasis has been very much on the macroeconomic reform of national economies (Rapley 1996; Harris and Fabricius 1996; Cornia et al. 1992; Cornia and Helleiner 1994) . Indeed, the involvement of African countries in SAPs has come to dominate both their economic and political agendas for the last two decades. Some observers have suggested that such programmes are one of a number of globalization processes; Amin and Thrift (1994) , for example, draw attention to the role and function of a range of seven 'globalising processes', one of which is the existence of influential international regulatory authorities such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), an organization which fundamentally controls the implementation and governance of SAPs. Allen and Thompson (1997, 214) go further in contending that liberalization, a central feature of IMF structural adjustment, is, among other things, 'invariably the mainstay of any representation of globalisation'. Although it may be tempting to represent the implementation of SAPs as a new colonialism, or a 'multilateral imperialism', it has to be recognized that this is a rather different process from that which existed in the colonial era, in that it is based on the globalization of capital, rather than its containment within the boundaries of empire (Agnew and Grant 1997) .
Nonetheless, despite various links to the global economy, it would seem that Africa is becoming increasingly peripheral in economic terms, ironically so in an era of apparent increasing economic globalization. Evidence suggests that globalization processes are spatially concentrated in the advanced capitalist economies, whilst the vast majority of the Third World remains marginal in both investment and trade terms. Indeed, the overwhelming proportion of global capital flows, and especially those of foreign direct investment, take place within and between the three world regions of North America, Western Europe and East Asia (Allen and Thompson 1997) . Between 1990 and 1993 , for example, subSaharan Africa received only 1.4 per cent of global foreign direct investment (Hirst and Thompson 1996, 66-7) , and there is nothing to suggest that this share has increased significantly since then. Peripheralization can also be measured in a broader way by noting, for example, the absolute or relative absence of stock markets, foreign missions and headquarters of international banks in most African countries, and, indeed, their negligible stake in the materialistic culture of globalization (Simon 1997) .
For African countries, therefore, economic and geographical peripherality, along with the widespread adoption of SAPs, might suggest that it is not unreasonable to expect that the engagements and experiences of African economies with the global economy may be different from those of the economies of the USA, Japan and the European Union, and these may be complicated further with the implementation of SAPs. Consequently, a literature grounded firmly in the experiences of the advanced capitalist economies may be less illuminating with regard to prevailing conditions in the 'other' countries of the world (Simon 1992). This is not to suggest that globalizing processes are irrelevant to Africa; indeed, the continent's incorporation into the world economy is well-documented (e.g. Amin 1976; Wallerstein 1974 Wallerstein 1980 Wallerstein 1989 Rodney 1982) . The challenge is more how such contemporary engagements are to be interpreted and represented.
Significantly, it is the cities of Africa, and typically the capital cities, which provide the links, both material and spiritual, into the world economy. Despite his critical view of the framing of current debates within a North perspective, Simon (1992) nonetheless argues that African cities must be seen in the broader perspective of their links to a wider political economy. However, the economic marginality of Africa ensures that these linkages are generally not well-developed, unlike some other parts of the world where cities, such as Hong Kong and Singapore, as early as the 1970s, were creating the conditions to permit them to compete in the world economy, recognizing that wider global engagement was something that could not be avoided (McGee 1986) . Importantly, these processes have not yet occurred on any scale for most of Africa, and so many recent significant engagements with the global economy have tended to be SAP experiences. Perhaps the only exception to this in Africa is South Africa, with its relatively developed industrial base and its stronger links to the global economy. Here, current debates appear to be framed rather differently in that urban housing provision in South Africa is seen more as the responsibility of the state or large private development companies (Seethal 1996; Napier 1998; Tomlinson 1999) , rather than by individual or petty entrepreneurship as elsewhere.
In the African context, it is in the cities where engagements with SAPs have been most visibly played out. Drawing largely on evidence from middle-income countries in Latin America, Gilbert (1993) argues that some of the current manifestations of urban deconcentration being experienced in that part of the world are associated with the impacts of SAPs and the globalization of economic activity. Hence, the effects on localities of structural adjustment measures, such as the privatization of economic activity and the emphasis on promoting export-based industries, as well as the more general effects of globalization, have contributed significantly to the shaping of the contemporary Third World city. The result has been both a reduction in rural-urban migration rates and hence in the growth of major cities, whilst, at the same time, a growth has occurred of both secondary cities and other locations in the national urban system. Gilbert (1993) suggests three explanations. Thus, there has occurred a population and economic deconcentration in the Third World city. An interpretation of this might be that the emergence of a neo-liberal ideology of structural adjustment at the global level has had local ramifications in decongesting and dispersing population and economic activities from the core of major Third World cities to other urban locations, resulting in polycentric growth.
In the different cultural and economic setting of South East Asia, McGee (1991) suggests a variation in terms of urban development. The urban transition in Asia can only be understood in terms of factors such as a sensitivity to the historical elements of the urban and agrarian transition; a recognition of its demographic, ecological and economic foundations; the role of the state; transactional transportation and commodity flows; and the effects of structural shifts in the labour force and in economies. McGee argues that population growth, a shift from agriculture to industry and services, and improvements in transportation networks have resulted in the increasing mix of rural and urban activities in the peri-urban areas of many major Asian cities. McGee (1991) concludes that what is occurring in Jakarta, for example, is the merging of rural and urban functions.
These two representations from different cultural and economic contexts raise important issues in relation to our understanding of contemporary Third World cities, and, in particular, how far African cities have demonstrated similar tendencies. In a trenchant paper, Riddell (1997) is highly critical of the negative impact of SAPs on African cities. Indeed, he suggests that SAPs in Africa have had such an impact that '[F]rom a position of leadership in national economies and a magnet attracting people from the countryside, the city has become the focal point of national depression' (Riddell 1997 (Riddell , 1303 .
Among a range of impacts suggested is the slowing of the urban growth of African cities, similar to Gilbert's observations with regard to Latin American cities. This reduction in growth rates is linked with what Riddell terms human underdevelopment, reductions in the quality of urban life and mounting inequalities. Consequently, there has been a rise of the informal economy, and the economy has become characterized by capital flight and brain drain from not only the cities, but even from the national economies themselves.
Previous work on the African city in the early stages of structural adjustment has tended to focus on urban form and patterns (O'Connor 1983) , and, more recently, on the processes and dynamics of urban change (Simon 1992) . It is the intention of this paper to explore how far recent African urban growth, and resultant changes in urban form and structure, can be explained by the impact of SAPs in a relatively mature phase of structural adjustment and macroeconomic reform. Drawing largely on empirical work from the cities of Accra (Ghana) and Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) to inform the analysis, it is the intention of this paper to explore the key factors underpinning recent urban growth in African cities, especially given the similarity of SAP experiences.
Recent African urban growth under structural adjustment
Both Ghana and Tanzania have been subjected to standard African structural adjustment and macroeconomic reform packages since the early 1980s. These have been very much characterized by the overall aims of replacing, or at the very least significantly reducing, state-based economic interventions by market mechanisms and of balancing national incomes and expenditures, reflecting ideological commitments to market economics and capitalism (Rothchild 1991; Ninsin 1991; Gibbon 1993 Gibbon 1995 Simon et al. 1995) . Typical measures include:
+ the privatization of parastatals and other nationalized industries; + the introduction of competition within the economy; + trade liberalization; + the abolition of centrally-fixed currency exchange rates; + the deregulation of currency markets; + active encouragement for the private sector, including both domestic and foreign capital; and + a reduction in the size of the public sector workforce, including retrenchment packages for public-sector workers.
Both Tanzania and Ghana were early SAP starters in Africa, perhaps reflecting the parlous states of their respective economies in the early 1980s. Tanzania's first involvement with reform can be traced back to the National Economic Survival Programme of 1981-2 which was both short-lived and ineffective, and was soon superseded by the first Structural Adjustment Programme of 1982-6. Ghana attempted a SAP after the 1966 coup, but that attempt pales in comparison to more recent attempts beginning in 1983 (Hutchful 1987) . The Rawlings' government in 1983 concluded that there was no alternative to structural reforms, and in that year Ghana embarked on an Economic Recovery Programme, followed soon after by a formal SAP. In both countries, macroeconomic reform has continued since then to be an economic way of life. Initially, there was considerable political suspicion, especially in Tanzania, and it was only in the last few years of Mwinyi's Presidency in the early 1990s, and since Mkapa's election in 1995, that significant structural change has come about in Tanzania. The situation in Ghana was somewhat different in that the military government, apart from being convinced of the merits of structural adjustment, made a pragmatic political decision to embark on such a programme, and hence was a willing participant at an early stage. Along with most of Africa, both Ghana and Tanzania have accepted the prevailing neo-liberal ideology of the World Bank and the IMF, amongst others. The content and thrust of these programmes has, however, subtly shifted. A reform agenda favouring private sector development, emphasizing macroeconomic stability and accelerating structural and institutional reforms is still firmly at the centre of IMF approaches, but there is now an increased emphasis on good governance and the role of civil society (Calamitsis 1999) , or what might be termed greater democratization and empowerment. Significantly, even though SAPs have emphasized the production of primary commodities, where African countries are deemed to have a clear comparative advantage in world trade terms, and which are overwhelmingly rural in location, nonetheless, it is the cities, and especially the capital cities because of their 'gateway' status, where the impacts of SAPs appear to be greatest (Rakodi 1997).
Interestingly, SAPs can be represented as an enabling agent, producing particular sets of opportunities for urban Africans, rather than as a direct cause of urban growth or decline. In particular, three key elements are apparent. The first concerns the liberalization of financial markets. Exchange control, and with it artificial and unrealistic exchange rates, have disappeared, and hence it is now no longer illegal for individuals to hold foreign currency. This fluidity in the financial system has encouraged many Africans resident abroad to remit hard currency in the knowledge that, should they so wish, the money can be just as easily remitted back out of the country. The second concerns trade liberalization which has allowed the relatively unimpeded import of a variety of goods. These include items such as building materials and motor vehicles, both of which have contributed to the recent physical expansion of African cities. The third element relates to the reduced participation of the state in the economy, and in particular the opportunities that have come about for some from privatization and deregulation. Nonetheless, despite these enabling conditions, it would appear that investment has tended to focus on consumption rather than production. Investment in industrial plant and other productive capital investment, an important factor in Gilbert's polycentric conceptualization in Latin America, is largely absent in many major African cities. The bulk of investment is instead being made in the housing sector, and both Accra and Dar es Salaam, since the early 1990s in particular, have experienced considerable urban sprawl into the peri-urban zones of the cities. In both instances, house-building has been the driving force behind the expansion of the cities. Individual builders are even prepared to build in areas which are at present unserviced, in anticipation of future service and infrastructure provision, to take advantage of current lower land values at these locations.
Several factors explain the widespread investment in housing. Firstly, the nature of SAPs in most African countries does not encourage capital or productive investment in urban areas. The economic emphasis of SAPs is on primary commodity production in the rural areas, rather than the industrial sector, and so there are few realistic opportunities for productive capital investment in the cities. However, the rapid expansion of housing reflects more than just limited investment opportunities. In Accra, a housing shortage has existed since independence; for example, in 1990, it was estimated that 27 460 houses were required by 1995. In response to the more liberal conditions of SAPs, the expatriate community in Accra has increased in size, which, along with an expanding Ghanaian middle class, has intensified pressures on housing in Accra. Hence, investment in housing increasingly yields good returns for property owners.
In Tanzania, the situation is somewhat different. There remains a residual, enduring suspicion of the state, and this is reflected in the continuing lack of confidence in the investment environment. Potential investors are concerned whether the Tanzanian Government can really be trusted not to return to the days of the 1967 Arusha Declaration and re-nationalize businesses and enterprises. Many have long memories and have no wish for history to repeat itself, and especially at their expense. Consequently, one tendency is to keep capital as liquid as possible, typically through short-term investment, through emphasis on import/export activities, and through cash holdings, typically in hard currencies if possible. Few entrepreneurs are prepared to risk large amounts of capital in large single-plant investments. Indeed, where productive investment does take place, it tends to be spread across a range of small-scale activities, perhaps as a hedge against any future nationalization. In the same way that a peasant farmer grows a range of food and export crops as insurance against crop failure, so does the new Dar es Salaam urban investor, as he/she spreads investment in small amounts across a range of activities of which housing is but one. Indeed, many suggest that housing is the safest of all investments, as this sector is likely to be one of the last to be nationalized, should Tanzania revisit its days of building socialism. This perceived lack of investment security is an important factor militating against productive investment from both domestic and international capital.
A further issue relates to the cultural environment of the new urban residents. Interestingly, McGee's (1991) notions of the merging of the rural and urban provide some help in the sense that for many groups in Africa, attachment to land is an important cultural attribute, and such values are maintained in an urban setting. This is increasingly played out in many African cities through the expansion of housing areas, satisfying a need to stake out a space. Symbolically, this is frequently reinforced by the construction of solid concrete walls, sometimes as high as three metres, around defined land, even if the land within the boundary is not itself developed for many years. Cultural attributes are further reinforced by the preponderance of low-rise, low-density development, reflecting the importance of having land around the house for cultivation. Many also associate social prestige with building and owning a house. For many Ghanaian migrants in Toronto, for example, there is pressure not to buy a house in Canada until one has been built in Ghana; indeed, an area in Kumasi has been named Canada after such migrants who build there (Owusu 1998). Significantly, in Ghana, although not yet in Tanzania, there are emerging private-sector specialist property companies which are developing housing estates (e.g. Regimanuel-Gray; African Concrete Products Ltd). Reinforcing this is the desire to have a house as an investment for old age. Most African economies possess no meaningful money markets for investment, nor well-developed social security systems for people to rely on after retirement. Moreover, African economies have typically experienced poor economic performance and high inflation rates over the last two to three decades. In such circumstances, housing has been perceived as a safe investment.
Factors enabled by SAPs
Current urban growth in major African cities can be attributed to four important enabling factors, three of which have been directly brought about or encouraged by structural adjustment: finance; transport; urban planning legislation and population growth. With regard to finance, there appear to be three main sources fuelling urban expansion. Firstly, there are hard currency remittances from nationals working overseas in North America, Europe, parts of the Middle East and South Africa, encouraged by the liberalized laws on currency transactions, one of the main policy instruments of SAPs. Estimates are that $276 million were remitted to Ghana by Ghanaians resident abroad, in 1996 alone (Daily Graphic 1998). This would rarely have been considered in pre-SAP days because of artificially disadvantageous exchange rates, inflexibility with currency flows, a general lack of confidence and laws banning ownership of foreign exchange. Secondly, capital has come from rapid accumulation based on trade liberalization. SAPs require that controls on both imports and exports are relaxed, businesses permitted to hold foreign exchange accounts, less 'accountable' sources of foreign currencies ignored by the authorities, and foreign exchange readily available internally through registered exchange dealers (forex bureaux). This has encouraged consumer booms in African cities such as Accra and Dar es Salaam, and many traders have done well financially. This 'windfall' cash from trade liberalization has sought outlets for investment, of which real estate in the peri-urban zone is particularly attractive, for the reasons suggested earlier. Those international and domestic traders who have made windfall trading gains, as well as those employed by private expatriate firms and NGOs, have swelled a small but growing urban middle class, and their demand for houses has contributed to the peri-urban expansion of both cities. A third source of capital, which seems apparent only in Dar es Salaam on any scale (it is more difficult to confirm its existence in Accra), has emanated from rent-seeking activities associated with the public sector. Some people in jobs of influence or control in the state sector have used opportunities to accumulate capital through corrupt activities. Significantly, this involved not only many high-grade officials, but also middle and lower grades. A clean-up campaign resulted in the publication of the Warioba Report in December 1996, a report which presented devastating evidence on the depth and scope of corrupt activities in Tanzania (Warioba 1997) . It was reported that in 1995 alone, for example, over $80 million in government revenue were 'lost' (Britain-Tanzania Society 1998). There has been a number of court cases in which officials have been convicted of embezzlement of public funds. The fear is that what is actually known is only the tip of the corruption iceberg. It is widely accepted in Dar es Salaam that this plundering of the state's resources has provided a considerable source of capital, fuelling urban expansion.
The second main factor involves recent improvements in transport systems, and particularly within the cities. The result has been to provide relatively easy access to areas in the peri-urban zone that previously were inaccessible, or, at best, extremely difficult to access. This has come about less through an improvement in the physical infrastructure and more through deregulation of public transport in the urban areas, another consequence of the acceptance of the conditions of SAPs. A common feature of many pre-SAP African cities was for urban bus companies either to be directly owned by the state, or for the state to exert a high degree of control, which amounted to much the same thing. With deregulation, not only did the number of buses increase dramatically with the arrival of many small operators, hence reducing urban travel times considerably, but more significantly the nature of public transport provision changed as well. A feature of public transport which has developed over the last few years has been the proliferation of different types of transport, ranging from conventional buses to minibuses, microbuses, converted pick-ups, and even Land Rovers, and it is this change which has had a large impact since the early 1990s on the urban space of many African cities. In particular, minibuses (tro-tros in Ghana, and dahla-dahla in Tanzania) are now operating routes off the main roads along dirt roads into the peri-urban zone, not only from city centres, but also from out-of-town feeder hubs. Land Rovers are being used in the same way along the even rougher roads and tracks. The emerging privatization of intraurban transport has been precipitated by individual Africans who have taken various actions to import vehicles (mostly used) to engage in economic activity. The result has been to permit significant urban development since the early 1990s at locations away from the arterial roads. As these areas become more densely settled, road upgrading takes place allowing in larger buses, and the smaller buses and Land-Rovers get pushed out further into the next peri-urban colonizer zones.
The third factor concerns the state's efforts to plan and manage urban growth and development, with particular emphasis on the conflict which has arisen between traditional and state land tenure systems. In both Accra and Dar es Salaam, land cannot be legally bought as a commodity. In Accra, individuals can lease land from either Stools or families; land owners (Stools and families) can plan the layout for a subdivision, grant leases to individual buyers, who in turn begin property development even before state agencies approve, or not, plans and layouts. OdameLarbi (1996) demonstrates how the layout for Dzowulu, a relatively high income residential area in Accra, shows major discrepancies between the plans submitted by land owners and those eventually approved by the Town and Country Planning Department. By the time of approval, some houses were already located in the middle of streets. In Dar es Salaam, partly because of the country's socialist past, all landholding is vested in the state. Yet, the delivery of land is vested in the hands of village leaders who are appointed or elected, or sometimes have inherited their positions. They provide local authorization for land deals, and such agreements are then reported to the state planning authorities. Such arrangements may not, however, be consistent with any zoning regulations established at planning offices. The problem is exacerbated by the whole issue of land allocation, a timebomb which highlights the confusion between differing landholding arrangements (United Republic of Tanzania 1992 1995). As Kironde (1992) points out, most African countries inherited colonial planning models which are not just outdated, but are frequently in conflict with traditional values. The nature of such received models, and the resulting confusion in many African cities, has resulted in the lack of enforcement of planning regulations and the ease of residential building in many African cities.
The final enabling factor is the continuing population growth still being experienced by African cities. Given that it is the capital cities which have experienced the highest growth rates and which continue to dominate national urban systems, it is not surprising that they continue to be major destinations of migrants. Although it has been suggested that in Latin America and, indeed, in Africa, urban growth rates have slowed down in recent years due to SAPs, the evidence would suggest that many African cities have experienced the opposite, including in peri-urban areas of cities. In Tanzania, the 1978-88 inter-censal figure showed that Dar es Salaam experienced an annual growth rate of nearly five per cent (Barke and Sowden 1992). However, for a variety of reasons, it has been argued that this may be an under-representation and that the figure may in fact be higher (Briggs 1993) . Sadly, the 1998 Tanzanian population census has been postponed indefinitely for financial reasons, and so it is impossible to be definite about Dar es Salaam's population growth since 1988. However, interviews with city planners confirm the assumption that, for planning purposes, the city's population was close to three million by early 1999; if this figure is even close to accurate, this represents an annual growth rate since 1988 of seven to eight per cent. The last Ghanaian population census, in 1984, attributed Accra with a population of 867 000, and metropolitan Accra with 1.2 million. City planners now estimate that the population is in excess of two million people, once again a significant increase over the last 15 years. That African cities continue to grow at rapid rates, especially compared to many other parts of the Third World, may well reflect the fact that national population growth rates still remain stubbornly high at around three per cent per annum.
The African city under relatively mature structural adjustment
Although observers, both in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World, have suggested that there has been a slowing of urban growth and a deconcentration of economic activity in cities in response to structural adjustment conditions, the evidence from Accra and Dar es Salaam would suggest that urban growth has at least been maintained, if not increased. It can be further argued that both Accra and Dar es Salaam have rather increased their respective dominance of the Ghanaian and Tanzanian urban systems since the introduction of SAPs, and that both are the salient of growth in their national economies. Interestingly, despite increased economic activity, the peripheral nature of African countries to the global economy has reinforced investment in exchange and consumption rather than in production. Hence, most African countries rely heavily on imports of manufactured goods, especially consumer goods, for distribution through the urban system. Consequently, investment in residential real estate has been the direction of recent urban expansion. There has, therefore, not been a deconcentration of urban activity and functions, or a fusion of the urban and rural in peri-urban areas, but rather a residential sprawl to these areas, which have then become unequivocally urban.
The generally held view suggests that Africans have fared poorly under SAPs (Kraus 1991; Riddell 1997; Post 1997) , and without doubt, many aspects of SAPs have unequivocally pressurized urban livelihoods. Nonetheless, many urban Africans, ironically perhaps, talk about the improvement of life chances that have come about as a result of SAPs. All too often, Africans are represented as passive victims, overlooking the reality that Africans are active agents, capable of responding to both local and global circumstances. For example, trade and foreign currency liberalization has resulted in foreign currency remittance inflows for investment, the increased importation of vehicles, and the emergence of property development companies. Human agency has, therefore, actively responded to circumstances and conditions, and these responses have contributed to the continuing expansion of African cities. An extension of this has been an emerging middle class in many cities, and this middle class has helped to fuel the building boom particularly in the peri-urban areas.
It is apparent that recent urban expansion in both Accra and Dar es Salaam has been characterized by residential building, frequently of high quality, in peri-urban areas with only limited commercial or industrial development, a pattern replicated in many other African cities. Commercial activity is often related to service-retail activities, such as fast food outlets, bars and general stores. Where industrial activity exists, it is frequently related to the continued expansion of such areas, and typically includes retailing of building materials and the manufacture of cement blocks. Investment tends to be in housing rather than capital plant, and the deconcentration of urban functions would appear to be still some way distant. For the African city the evidence would suggest that the functional links between the periurban zone and the city have become stronger in recent years. It may be, therefore, that there is a case for arguing for the existence of a separate African urban subtype of the Third World city under relatively mature SAPs, a manifestation of local realities interacting with global forces.
It must be stressed, however, that SAPs have not been the cause of such urban forms, rather they have enabled local-scale factors to renegotiate their relationship with, and responses to, global forces, contributing to the emergence of particular urban forms. These contributory factors include the consumption emphasis of contemporary African urbanization; the insecurity of African economies; the importance of housing as an object of investment; Africans as active agents responding to both local and global circumstances and conditions; continuing urban growth; and the emergence of what might be termed a middle class, as yet small, in many African cities. Without doubt, the specific history, culture and political economy of Africa has mediated its links to the global economy in ways which may be different, in either degree or form, with other parts of the world. Indeed, for African cities, these links have been expressed in terms of consumption and exchange rather than production, and this very attribute continues to have a profound impact on recent urban change in the region. 
